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This thesis provides a critical analysis of The Navy's
Message Processing and Distribution System (MPDS) develop-
ment. A historical approach is used in presenting the
system's life cycle development beginning with the planning
phase and ending with the integrated logistic support phase.
Several maintenance problems which occurred after the system
was accepted for Fleet use were examined to determine if
they resulted from errors in the acquisition process. The
underlying intent of the thesis is to use the MPDS to exa-
mine the critical decision points of the acquisition process
and offer constructive recommendations for avoiding the
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I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the pertinent
aspects of development and life cycle support of the Navy's
Automated Message Processing and Distribution System (HPDS)
.
The historical section will discuss the imperative need to
automate the Navy's communication systems. It will then
explain the Navy's decision to begin developmental effort to
automate many of the manual communications functions.
The development of the MPDS will next be discussed with






Next, a few unique problems with system maintenance, logis-
tic support, and training will also be examined.
Finally, cause/effect conclusions will be drawn and
coupled with constructive recommendations for future major
system dsvel opraent projects.

II. PROJECT HISTORY
A. BASELINE II COMMUNICATIONS STUDY
In October of 1966, the Commander of the First Fleet con-
ducted a Communications Readiness Exercise to determine the
Fleet's ability to handle large volumes of message traffic
during simulated wartima conditions. This exercise was
known as Baseline II, and it revealed the fleet was unable
to handle large message volumes without encountering signi-
ficant delays. These delays usually occurred in areas where
humans were required to manually handle or process the mes-
sages. Two of the areas where major delays frequently
occurred were identified as the Naval Communication Stations
(NAVCOMSTAS) and Radio Central on board the naval ships.
The Naval Electronics Laboratory Center (NELC) in San-
Diego was directed to develop a system which would reduce
the shipboard delays in message processing and distribution.
The objective was to automate as many manual functions as
possible. NELC installed the first experimental shipboard
Message Processing Distribution System (MPDS) aboard the USS
Oklahoma City (CG-5) . This initial system was quite small
and consisted of a single processor, magnetic disk storage
device, and a high speed printer. Many updates and enhance-
ments were added to this system as they became available.
Several remote printers were later installed at important
locations throughout the ship, but no attempt was made to
add remote interactive terminals (Ref. 1) Consequently, all
outgoing message traffic had to be physically deposited at
Radio Central for transmission from the ship.
B. CVN-68 MESSAGE PROCESSING AND DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM
At the same time that NELC was working on the CG-5 MPDS,
it began work on the fully automated MPDS destined for ins-
tallation on the USS Nimitz (CVN-63) . This system was to be
part of the ship's original equipment, so it was extremely

important that the project's completion date correspond
closely to the completion of construction of the Nimitz. Had
MPDS not been ready and available on time, the Nimitz would
have been forced to go to sea with an extremely degraded
manual communications system. Consequently, proper manage-
ment of the system's development by NELC was of immense
importance if the Navy's readiness objectives were to be
obtained.
The Nimitz was originally scheduled to come out of con-
struction in late 1973, but reactor delivery slippage caused
several delays which resulted in a late commissioning in
1975. Since the MPDS was behind schedule, the delivery date
slippage for the reactors gave NELC and Planning Research
Company (PRC) badly needed additional time to correct sev-
eral software problems and install the completed system
onboard the Nimitz in 1974 without causing any further
delays. [ Rsf . 2]
NELC used the old aircraft carrier, USS Bunker Hill, to
test the operation of MPDS in a shipboard environment [Ref.
3], This procedure provided NELC with the opportunity to
examine the effects of the shipboard electricity, excess
humidity, and metallic influence upon the MPDS.
C. MAINTENAHCE PHASE
In 1975 the Fleet Combat Direction System Support
Activity, San Diego, (FCDSSASD) , assumed system support
responsibility for MPDS. During the following five years,
eighteen major changes were approved and released which
affected one or all of the following major systems:
1. Operating System (OS)
2. Software Maintenance System (SMS)
3. Equipment Maintenance Sub-system (EMSS)
4. System Magnetic Tape Retrieval (3MP.)
[Ref. 4]

In 1976, the Navy awarded the MPDS software maintenance
contract to Syncrotech Software Corporation in San Diego.
This contract was "sole source" and went -co Syncrotech
because they employed a great number of PRC programmers who
were involved in the initial development of MPDS [ Ref . 5].
D. ADDITIONAL INSTALLATIONS OF MPDS
An identical copy of MPDS was later installed aboard the
(JSS Eisenhower (CVN-69), and a copy is presently being
installed aboard the Vinson (CVN-70) . In July of 1973, in
response to the Chief of Naval Operations, the Naval Elec-
tronic Systems Command began a project called the Naval
Modular Automated Communications System (NAVMACS) . Since
NAVMACS was designed to fulfill the communication needs of
all Naval ships and the carrier version NAVMACS V-5 will
soon be completed, no additional copies of MPDS will be pro-
duced for: future carriers. NAVSEA has also authorized the
installation of the NAVMAC V-5 system to replace the MPDS
onboard the USS Nimitz, (JSS Eisenhower, and the Vinson as
these ships enter their regular overhaul cycles.
10






Ihe initial specifications required that the project
office "utilize equipment units or designs which are in





Magnetic Tape Unit (MTU) RD-294
The decision to use available equipment offered the
possible advantage of reducing development cost because it
is much cheaper to purchase additional units than it is to
develop the initial units. It also helps to improve the
Navy's Supply System Purchasing Office's economies of scale
since it serves to increase the overall purchase volume.
This procedure also conforms to the Department of Defense
Standardization Program which requires the services to pur-
chase existing equipment. Using existing equipment involves
less risk, so it helps prevent cost overruns and schedule
slippages. It also lessens the logistic problems which are
generally associated with unique equipment items. Items
which are already in the Navy stock system often have
maintenance contracts established with the vendors. Unfor-
tunately, buying existing equipment did not solve MPDS's
logistic problems because the manufacturers of many of these
vendors stopped producing the equipment. Therefore
replacement has become increasingly difficult and equipment
overhauls have become longer and more costly.
2. hardware Development Items
Many hardware items which were required for MPDS
were not available in the naval stock system and had to be
11

contracted out for development. Several of the major equip-












The Data Accumulation and Distribution Unit (DADU)
was a very sophisticated and unique piece of hardware which
was developed to perform the system multiplexor function for
MPDS [Ref. 7], The Electronic Switching Unit (SSU) was
another unit which had to be developed to allow all three
processors access to the magnetic disk. The ESU has proven
to be very reliable, but its failure would restrict two of
the three processors from accessing the single disk.. The
ONI-43 is a device used to interface MPDS with the fleet
satellite broadcast, Common User Digital Information
Exchange Subsystem (CUDIX) . This device was developed after
MPDS was accepted for fleet use, and it became apparent that
MPDS required a backup system which would provide broadcast




General requirements for all equipment developed for
MPDS are referenced in the specification document [Ref. 8].
Military standards were referenced which set equipment
requirements for temperature, shock, resistance, low level
signaling and reliability [Ref. 9]. Functional specifica-
tions for the hardware included processing rates required,
code which it must be capable of processing, security
requirements, and other general functional requirements.
4 Areas Not Specified
Difficulty meeting several of the original specifi-
cations arose because the Navy was setting standards for new
equipment which was destined for shipboard use and had to
12

perform functions which had not existed prior to the
project. Consequently, numerous changes were proposed and
made to the original specifications as the program effort
progressed and the contractors experience improved in the
new development.
Many of the items which were developed for the pro-
ject clearly lacked detailed specifications, so it was left
to the personnel in the program office and the contractors
to work out the details. The result was a description of
what had been built rather than a specif icat ion of what was
to be developed [Ref. 10]. Lack of specifications offered
the advantage of allowing the program office and contractors
the opportunity to make important changes to the system's
design which frequently resulted in improved system
performance.
due change which improved system operation was the
relocation of terminals in Radio Central. Originally, two
terminals were to be used for control and placed at the con-
trol console with another terminal placed in a maintenance
area. The program office altered the arrangement by placing
all three terminals at the control console, and this greatly
improved the reliability of the oontrol system because the
AN/UYA-9 terminals have experienced a low mean time between
failure (MTBF) and a high mean *-ime to repair (MTTR) [Ref.
11].
Lack of specifications also had many obvious disad-
vantages. It was often difficult for the contractor and
program office to know when a development was actually fin-
ished because they had nothing to compare the finished
product against [Ref. 12]. It proved to be a problem with
the program sponsors because they would complain that "the
Navy was not getting what it originally asked for" [Ref.
13 ]. Allowing the project office the freedom to design the
system where specifications did not exist tended to
13

encourage configuration confusion. It is vitally important
that a clear design pattern be outlined in the specification
to prevent the developmental effort from wandering off
course. A detailed initial set of specifications would
have resolved this conflict.
B. SOFTWARE SPECIFICATIONS
The original specifications required all software to be
"modular in design such that addition, deletion, cr change
of function be made with a minimum of reprogramming" [P.ef.
14]. The requirement that the software be modular in design
was fulfilled by the contractors. However major problems
with adding modules and changing functions have occurred
during the maintenance phase because of excessively high CPU
core utilization. The specifications did not set utiliza-
tion limitations upon the amount of core which the programs
were permitted to consume. The requirement for the contrac-
tor to meet performance specifications did serve to limit
the amount of core which should be used and still meet per-
formance objectives, but allowances were not made for future
growth and program enhancements [ Ref . 15].
1 • Manual Security Measures
The Informational Security System Design for J1PDS
was extremely important because MPDS completely changed the
structure of shipboard message handling and this created
numerous new security concerns. Prior to HPDS, security was
provided by the thick metal and heavy security doors around
Radio Central. Distribution security was accomplished by
restricting access to those indiviiiuals who were designated
in writing by their department heads. An up-to-date list cf
these personnel with their names, security clearances, and
the highest level of message classifications that they were
authorized to receive was continuously maintained at radio




2. Automated Security Measures
After MPDS, one method of providing additional pro-
tection which was identified in the specifications was a
coded device which would be used at the remote terminals to
inform the control console of the classification level of
the terminal [Ref. 16]. A security card reading device was
never developed, but a manual code entry device was devel-
oped whereby the user could type in his classification code
and have messages and reports distributed to his terminal at
the appropriate classification level.
The project Office was afforded considerable lati-
tude in developing a software system which was able to check
the validity of the codes entered at the terminals. An
operating system security module was developed which com-
pared the code of the user to a Master Security List (MSL)
.
Ihe MSL contained a listing of all the authorized users,
their codes and the levels of security which they were
cleared to access [Ref. 17]. The specifications also
required special acknowledgement for receipt of top secret
materials. Additionally, the completed MPDS provided a top
secret disclosure sheet to assist the authorized recipient
in maintaining tight control over the sensitive document.
3. Operating System Security Options
(Jnfortunately, the projects software specifications
did not address in detail several other new security con-
cerns which were encountered in the new message handling
system. One critical aspect of the software development
which was not addressed specifically was the security pro-
tection to be provided by the operating system. Since
operating systems vary widely in the amount of protection
which they provide for their data, it is prudent to specify
the exact features that are desirable to be included in the
system to be developed.
15

IBM marketed a protection mechanism in its operating
systems called "locks" which served tc prevent unauthorized
read/write accesses to secure blocks of memory. IBM also
used the supervisor/problem mode to distinguish between
users and executive states. This differentiation helped
prevent unauthorized alterations of instructions, storage
protection locks, and the operating system [Sef. 18].
The Multics operating system which was developed by
Honeywell Information Systems offered one of the most
advanced security systems in production. It offered several
sophisticated features which were not available on IBM Sys-
tems. Dne important component was the internal password
encryption which served to prevent illegal disclosure of the
master password list. This protection was accomplished by
encrypting the password which the user entered and comparing
it against the internal password file. Therefore if a sub-
versive agent were able to gain access to the computer and
capture the internal password file, it would be of little
value to him without the encryption code. A second impor-
tant aspect of the Multics Security System was the use of
audit trails to keep a record of the users who accessed the
classified data. [Ref. 19]. This procedure is extremely
effective when the users review the audit trail on a regular
basis and compare it against their access logs.
4 . System Vulnerability
Security safeguards are particularly important in a
multiprogramming/multiprocessing environment where the pro-
cessors are required to handle multiple processes at the
same time. These processes will usually have different
security values and will be sharing the same system
resources. A system or device which can guarantee complete
isolation and protection of the secure process from unau-
thorized access or disclosure has not been developed. Even
the Multics system which was designed with security as one
16

of its primary objectives was penetrated by a special U.S.
Air Force Tiger Team who was tasked to assess the security
of the computers used by the Air Force. Security patches
were used to correct the security weaknesses which were dis-
covered by the team, but these patches didn't prevent the
Tiger Team from making additional penetrations by exploiting
other system weaknesses [ Ref . 20].
Attempts to upgrade the existing level of MPDS security
to include some of the features present in MULTICS would be
extremely costly and would not guarantee the security of the
system. since it is difficult to upgrade security, a pro-
gram's sponsor must be very explicit in stating in the
system specifications the type of security protection that
is wanted.
C. CONFIGURATION CONTROL
1 . FCS Specification
The control of system configuration proved to be one
of the most difficult problems confronting the program off-
ice. The lack of precise specifications was one of the
major reasons for uncontrolled growth in the Facility Con-
trol System (FCS) . The Military Specification for the
Message Processing and Distribution System for (CVAN-68)
dated 30 Jan. 1967 required the following monitoring
capabilities
:
3.2.1.11 A continuous or periodic indication of suspected
channel trouble shall be provided to the Facility Control
Console for those channels being processed automatically.
The Specifications also provided the follow guidance on how
FCS will interface with MPDS.
3.2.1.10 The interface between the MPDS central processor
and the FCS circuit sensing multiplexer, to provide for
input of the communication circuit sensing signals to the




To comply with the above guidance, the project off-
ice and contractor were forced to decide what ^ype of
sensing mechanism would be used to monitor or interrogate
the channels and how often the sensing should take place.
Since both the contractor and the project office wanted the
best system for the Navy, they frequently elected to develop
a system which offered high performance as opposed to a less
elaborate system whioh offered marginal performance at a
smaller cost [Ref. 21]. Many other decisions had to be made
concerning "how to fulfill the specifications" and these
eventually caused the FCS to grow in size, time, and cost.
The completed FCS would have provided many benefits
to the ship's communication personnel for it would have
greatly reduced the amount of manual operator intervention
required for channel and terminal connections. It also
would have provided an increased quality control capability
which has been desired for a long time by fleet communica-
tion users.
Despite the recognized advantages in operator cost
reductions and improved system reliability, the development
of FCS by NELC had to be cancelled by NAVELEX because it was
exceeding the original estimates for cost, resource utiliza-
tion, and date for delivery [Ref. 22]. The amount of code
and its corresponding core requirements had grown to such a
degree that it was estimated that the completed FCS project
would have required additional CP-642B central processing
units if MPDS was to continue to meet the original perfor-
mance specifications.
It should also be noted that the implementation of
FCS would not have significantly improved MPDS' message dis-
tribution capabilities nor would it have increased the
system's processing speed. The primary advavtages of FCS lie
in it's improved quality monitoring and reduction in the
number of operators required to manage the system. Since the
18

primary objective of MPDS was to correct the shipboard
communication deficiencies of slow message handling and poor
message distribution which wers revealed during the Baseline
II Communications Study, it is apparent that the FCS could
only be viewed as desireable excess feature.
2. Feasibility Study
a. General Approach
In June of 1970, Planning Research Company
(PRC) , who was NELC's software contractor for MPDS, did an
Intergration of Communication System Study which included a
Quality Monitoring Trade-off Study. The goal of the study
was to determine the feasibility of integrating an Automatic
Quality Monitoring System (AQMS) and a Frequency Monitoring
System (FMS) with MPDS. AQMS and FMS were originally





Positive conclusions were drawn about the feasibility of all
three areas. PRC did recognize the interrelationships bet-
ween cost and time and premised their positive time
feasibility conclusions upon adequate steady funding.
PRC compared the relative ease of operating the
AQMS to the labor intensive Manual Quality Monitoring System
and called the difference one of the benefits. The improved
accuracy was also considered a benefit. The contractor did
not try to quantify the value of these benefits. The amount
of risk evaluated for the project was consistently rated as
low. Appendix (A) provides a listing of the additional
equipment and software required to develop the AQMS and the




PRC presented the following AQM cost formula in
their Technical Objective VII section 2.2.3:
Cost in the present context is that expenditure associ-
ated with the implementation of AQM expressed as a
differential cost as follows:
C = C - c
AQM MQM
where
C = total integrated FC system cost
AQM
C = present FC system cost
MQM
As shown above, the cost for AQHS was determined
by subtracting the cost of the old manual system from the
estimated cost of the automatic system. These costs were
identified in Appendix (B) . The exhibit provides a detailed
listing of the additional hardware and software required to
develop the automatic system and the estimated cost associ-
ated with each item.
c. Additional Cost Factors
In addition to the three feasibility studies
mentioned above, it would have been beneficial to include a
section of study on organizational feasibility. This sec-
tion would quantitatively evaluate the difficulties which
the organization (ship) could expect when implementing the
proposed system.
The cost of implementation can become quite sev-
ere if the sailors view the new system as a threat to their
security. These feelings often develop because the sailor
was not trained in the operation of the new system, and he
feels his position of knowledge and authority is in jeo-
pardy. The sailors may respond to the perceived threat with
either passive or active resistance [Ref.24]. Any resis-
tance to a new system will invariably cause both delays in
implementation and increases in the final project cost.
20

Although it is often difficult to accurately
anticipate the exact amount of resistance which will be
encountered and the resulting cost, an attempt must be made
if the project costs estimated are to reasonably resemble
the actual cost. MPDS experienced its share of operator and
maintenance personnel passive resistance, and it is reason-
able to conclude that the FC3 would also have been received
by the ship's crew with mixed feelings.
A comprehensive cost/benefit analysis would also
have estimated the cost of training the fleet sailors to
operate and maintain the proposed system. Appendix (B) and
Appendix (C) do not address these costs. These areas had
the potential to become very costly for several reasons.
The fact that the FCS project was unique to the large
(CVN-68) class carriers would have made some additional
training activities necessary. New instructors would have
to be trained, class training plans and lessons would have
to be prepared, and training materials would have to be pur-
chased. All of these efforts and expenses would have been
for very small classes and would have to be completed before
qualified personnel could be sent to the ship to operate the
new system.
PRC's method of computing the cost by subtract-
ing the cost of the MQK from the cost of the AQMS may not
have revealed the full cost difference because AQMS was
designed to utilize existing MPDS equipment. This utiliza-
tion imposes a cost upon the entire system in the form of
either reduced performance or smaller reserve capacity avai-
lable for future growth.
In order for the Navy to have made a completely
knowledgeable decision about the feasibility of the proposed
project, it would have been necessary to identify all of the
costs, (including cost of using existing systems), and to




Another area of the MPDS project development which
experienced excessive growth was that of reports which were
generated or could be retrieved at the remote locations.
The military specifications addressed this issue in several
locations.
3.2.1.9 Storage and retrieval capabilities for long-term
files shall be provided.
3.2.2.2.5.1 It shall be possible to retrieve ail or
selected portions of the log information either on
demand, in which the operator inputs a request to the
system by keyboard, or periodically, in which case the
log information is output without operator information.
Both hard-copy and soft-copy retrievals shall be possi-
ble.
The following portion of the specifications provides
a general framework for the types of information which the
system would be required to accumulate and disseminate:
3.2.2.2.5 Automated message accounting shall include:
(a) Attachment of unique system message numbers for
accounting and retrieval purposes.
Jb
Journalling of messages for accounting purposes.
c) Extracting of statistical data from message
fie.
(d) Special accounting for top secret message deliv-
ery .
To determine the type of reports required and the
elements of data which have to be accumulated and stored,
the project office consulted with the users. That which
resulted was a system which was originally developed to pro-
duce HI different reports [ Ref . 25]. This placed a heavy
burden upon the entire system and greatly increased the
amount of secondary storage required by the system. These
reports were printed at periodic intervals but could also be
retrieved upon demand by the users at their terminals, pro-
vided the requested information was within the security
range of the user's terminal. Initially, every user could
retrieve any report contained within the system. Since
22

retrieval of long routine reports during peak message load-
ing periods severely degraded overall system performance,
and a genuine need to know could not be substantiated from a
terminal retrieval request, future changes to MPDS res-
tricted report production to scheduled runs unless special
off-line requests were submitted and approved [Ref. 26].
Recent software changes which have been released to
the fleet have corrected many of the problems with the ini-
tial report package. These changes have limited both the
content and distribution of several periodic reports. Surveys
of the fleet user groups have resulted in adding important
tracking programs which generate reports on various aspects
of system performance.
One, recently added, provides critical information
to the Communication Officer about system message volume
during peak loading periods. This data was either missing
in the original 47 reports or it was obscurely buried where
it could not be used or readily accessed by personnel who
needed the information [Ref. 27]. It became evident that
the initial querying of the users produced an inaccurate
composite of their requirements. The reports which MPDS
produced resembled what the user thought that they wanted
rather than what they truly needed.
This lack of user understanding of his actual
requirements became apparent in the development of the 01-9
remote receiver/transmitter user terminal. Seventeen func-
tional buttons were designed into the terminals to satisfy
the users' requirements. Usage patterns have shown that the
operators seldom use more than six of the functions. Five
of the other functions were used by the maintenance person-
nel. The net result was six user specified functional
capabilities designed into the system terminals which were




1 . Broadcast Screening Test Objectives
Special testing of the MPDS broadcast screening
capability was conducted by Naval Electronic System Command
Southwest Division (NA VELECSYSCOMSOWESTDIV) at the MPDS test
bed at NELC on May 14, 15, 16 and 18, of 1973. The total
test time was 28 hours. Excerpts of real world live traffic
were taken from four different geographic broadcast areas in
the Atlantic, Eastern Pacific, Western Pacific, and the Med-
iterranean. The primary objective was to test the system's
ability to correctly compare the addresses of the various
broadcast messages against the addresses contained in the
MPDS guard list (GML) . The GML contained approximately 150
addresses [Ref. 29], A second test objective was to deter-
mine how accurately the system could automatically read and
distribute the incoming message to the appropriate remote
terminal.
2. System Inprovement Tests
Several System Improvement Tests (SIT) were also
conducted by NA VELECSYSCOMSOWESTDIV. These SIT's were given
to evaluate the effectiveness of modifications made to the
hardware/software subsystem. Numerous modifications were




Users Involvement in Testing
The Broadcast Screening Test and SIT both used Nim-
itz (CVN-68) crew members to operate the system. Utilizing
the future operators of the system for test operations pro-
vides many advantages to the project team. First it
provides them with an exceilant opportunity to train the
future users in the proper operation of the equipment. It is
also an exceilant opportunity to instill in them valuable
confidence in the system. This confidence can be a very
important advantage to the project team during the
24

implementation phase [ Ref . 31]. The spirit, of cooperation
and friendship which often develop es between the developer
and fleet operators during the testing phase can go a long
way toward over coming the skepticism and resistance which
often plagues projects in later phases. Finally, the project
team can receive important feedback from the operators con-
cerning operational difficulties and constructive
suggestions for systam improvements.
4 . Restrictive Testing Procedures
Although the primary objective of testing the broad-
cast screening capability of MPDS was fulfilled, the results
of the test were obtained under very restricted conditions.
Had they been obtained under simulated or actual operational
conditions, then the project teaa would have known how the
system would function when it encountered the technical and
human stresses associated with fleet operations [Ref. 32].
Massage and report retrievals are two operations which sig-
nificantly increase the stress upon the system. Neither of
these functions were permitted during the Broadcast Screen-
ing Test. Experience has shown that -i-he combined effect of
these two processes can seriously reduce the overall effec-
tiveness of system performance.
25

IV. INTEGRATED LOGISTIC SUPPORT
A. SUPPORT ACTIVITIES
1 . FCDSSASD
In 1975 FCDSSASD was originally tasked to provide
life cycle maintenance for the Massage Processing and Dis-
tribution System. To facilitate this support, a special
suite of equipment, (identical to the MPDS equipment onboard
ass Nimitz) , was installed at FCDSSASD [Ref. 33].
2. NTSIC
In 1979 the Naval Telecommunications Systems Inte-
gration Center (NTSIC) assumed life cycle maintenance
responsibilities for MPDS [Ref. 34]. NTSIC has a duplicate
model of the MPDS hardware and software which is presently
onboard the USS Nimitz and USS Eisenhower. This model
serves as a testing facility for all new software modifica-
tion and hardware changes before they are delivered to the
fleet for installation.
NTSIC also serves as coordinator for all software
change proposals (SCP) [Ref. 35]. A sample list of 3CP can-
didates for MPDS software change release #10 is shown in
Appendix (0) . This list was developed by sending question-
naires to the fleet users and compiling the results. The
candidates for change were then discussed with the senior
communications personnel from the carriers prior to the
meeting of the Communications Change Control Board (CC3)
.
Only change items which received unanimous user support and
agreement were forwarded to the formal (CC3) . Final Comman-
der Naval Telecommunications (CNTC) approval for software
changes is based upon the outcome of the board. NTSIC is
intimately involved with every step of this process [Ref.
36].
3. Syncrotec Software Corporation
The MPDS software maintenance contract was awarded
to Syncrotec from San Diego. The fact that many of the
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original MPDS software development programmers left Planning
Research Corporation (PRC)
,
(the original softw?re contrac-
tor), and went to work for Syncrotec weighed he. vily in the
decision to select them as the software maintenai :e contrac-
tor. Since MPDS had unique software to perfoim difficult
applications, it was important to choose a software mainte-





Commander Franson, who is the Deputy Director of
NAVTELSYSIC, described the first training of the Nimitz^
precommissioning crew as being very successful. This was
due in part to the high priority that the project team
placed upon utilizing every training opportunity. The Exe-
cution Plan for Operational Capability Evaluation
(OPCAPEVAL) stated the following training objective:
" Every effort will be made to make the MPDS available
to the Nimitz crew for training during contingency per-
iod. "
This training was in addition to practical experience which
the crew members obtained while operating and maintaining
the equipment during the scheduled test periods. Appendix
(S) provides a schedule of events which occurred during the
OPCAPEVAL and the long periods designated for system train-
ing [Ref. 37 ]. .
2. Operational Training Problems
After the system had been implemented and the USS
Nimitz became operational, training deficiencies began to
surface. These deficiencies became especially evident when
the USS Nimitz made her overseas deployments. In a trip
raport from two Synchrotec software technicians, the follow-
ing comments were made concerning training [Ref. 38]:
"The lasting impression that remains with us however, is
that the weakest link in the operation and performance
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of MPDS is now unquestionably the operators themselves.
Knowledge of basic communications procedures and prac-
tices (let alone, knowledge of MPDS) was sadly lacking
among many of the second and third class petty officers
aboard ship, and until the sailors are familiar with how
to communicate in the Navy environment, we can hardly
expect them to become proficient at operating MPDS."
This concern about the level of shipboard personnel training
was also shared by the officers onboard the USS Nimitz. In
a message to the Commander of the Sixth Fleet (COMSIXTHFLT)
,
the Commander of Task Force Sixty (CTF SIX ZERO) made the
following comments [Ref. 39]:
"There is no software expertise onboard Nimitz capable
of providing the level of support that recent operations
have documented as required to maintain MPDS in even a
marginally operational status. . . . The onboard soft-
ware techs should be relieved by a technician qualified
in system restoral and installation of system fixes.
It is clear from the above statements that the shipboard
technicians lacked understanding about how MPDS operated and
how to maintain the system. This leads to the obvious ques-
tion of how did the USS Nimitz's training profile drop from
its initial high state to one which can barely maintain
operational capability.
3 . Scarcity of Instructors
The Commander of Naval Education and Training
(CNET) , who is in charge of training conducted in the Navy,
had extreme difficulty finding qualified instructors to
teach MPDS operator and maintenance classes. There are sev-
eral reasons why this problem developed.
a. The Commissioning of the Eisenhower
When the Eisenhower got commissioned, it
required a full compliment of qualified operators and
maintenance technicians to take her to sea. Her precommis-
sioning crew did not have the advantage of being able to
participate in the system development of MPDS as the Nimitz
precommissioning had done. Consequently, they were not as
well trained, and qualified personnel had to be acquired
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from either the Nimitz or ashore. Since the training
command had second priority to fleet units for personnel
manning, CNET could not obtain or retain the instructors
that- it needed to conduct MPDS classes [Ref. 40].
b. Sea/Shore Rotation Problems
The shortage of trained personnel combined with
the expanding need for sailors who possessed HPDS operation
and maintenance experience caused a serious extension of
the normal sea/shore rotation interval. A sailor could
routinely expect to receive orders from the USS Nimitz to
the USS Sisenhower rather than the typical rotation ashore
which most sailors have grown to expect. The net effect of
this extension at sea has been a severe reduction in the
number of qualified personnel staying in the Navy.
c. Civilian Opportunities
The third reason for CNET being short of
instructors is the intense demand for individuals with high
technical expertise in the civilian market. These civilian
firms usually offer very high starting salaries to qualified
personnel. Since MPDS technicians were generally some of
our most highly trained sailors, their marketability was
exceptionally high. With the rapid exodus of highly trained
technicians and barely enough personnel to man the fleet
units, it was not surprising that CNET was unable to provide
the necessary number of instructors to conduct the courses.
4. NTSIC Solution
Although training is generally conducted by CNET,
the lack of available instructors made it impossible for
CNET to adequately train the MPDS operators and maintenance
personnel. NTSIC attacked the training problem in two
areas. First, they sent NTSIC MPDS specialists onboard the
aircraft carriers during their deployments to train them in
operating and maintaining the system under heavy stress.
Secondly, they offered an 18 week maintenance course and a S
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week operators course at regular intervals to prepare
sailors, who were ordered to the USS Nimitz or the USS
Eisenhower, for their jobs. These courses have proven to be
very beneficial in improving the ships 1 capability to oper-
ate and maintain the MPDS with their own personnel.
5. Alternative Design to !1PDS
a. Description of NAVMACS
Many of the problems encountered in training the
crews of the USS Nimitz and USS Eisenhower in the proper
operation and maintenance of MPDS have not been experienced
by fleet units using the Naval Modular Automated Communica-
tions System (NA7MACS) . The NAVMACS program provides a
family of Automated Communications Systems sized to meet the
needs of all sizes of ships. The classes of NAVMACS range
from the most basic: NA7MACS V1 and increases in sophistica-
tion and capability through the tfAVMACS 72, 73, and 75. The
prime advantage of this system is that the more complex sys-
tems retain and build upon the components of the basic
system. Appendix (F) provides an example of how the more
advanced systems utilize the standard hardware of the simple
system [Ref. 41 ].
b. Training Advantages of Modular Design
The above approach to system development offers
several training advantages over the MPDS. The training
task is much easier because sailors who are enroute to a
ship which has the NAVMACS 71 basic system installed could
be trained with students who are destined to serve on a
NAVMACS 73 ship. This is possible because both systems
share the same basic modules. The problems of small sized
classes and lack of guaiified instructors which troubled
MPDS are not a problem with NAVMACS [Eef. 42]. CNET has
been able to successfully fill its instructor billets, and
the increased size of the classes has provided CNET with
substantial economies of scale.
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o. MPDS Replacement System
The NAVMACS V5 will offer the same basic message
processing and distribution services as MPDS. It is cur-
rently scheduled to be installed on all of the future CVN»s
after the Vinson. It is also scheduled to replace the MPDS
units on the Nimitz, Eisenhower, and Vinson, as they undergo
their regular overhauls. CNET will assume training respon-
sibilities for this system [Ref. 43].
C. MAINTENANCE
1 . System Reliability Problem
System reliability is one of the greatest concerns
for users of online computer systems since the primary rea-
son for installing such systems is to satisfy the need for
immediate information. This need for reliability becomes
even more important when the online system is tasked with
carrying tactical and strategic intelligence messages which
may effect the wartime readiness posture of the host ship
and any ships subordinate to it.
The problem of MPDS reliability was addressed in a
letter from the commander of Carrier Group Two (who was
embarked onboard the OSS Nimitz) to the Commander Naval Air
Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet.
2 . Equipment Problems
Many of the hardware items which were developed
especially for MPDS became maintenance problems. Low mean
time between failures (MTBF) and/or lack of replacement
parts were the two primary reasons for excessive system down
time. Following will be a discussion of hardware problems
related specifically to the Data Acquisition and Distribu-




The Data Acquisition and Distribution Unit
(DADO") TD 1066, which functions as an input/output control
interface unit, is unique in design and is considered essen-
tial for normal operations. This unit has been a continuous
maintenance concern since the system was first installed on
the Nimitz in 1974. The Supervisor of Shipbuilding at New-
port News, Virginia, wrote the following comments to Admiral
Kidd about the need for logic and control printed circuit
cards for the DADU.
No replacement cards are available to immediately
satisfy Nimitz' s demands when one of these . . . cards
fail, which is often. It has become apparent that lit-
tle attention has been given to ensuring adequate
provisioning for unique MPDs hardware [Ref. 45].
DADO* failures have frequently interrupted normal shipboard
message communication since its initial installation. Its
breakdowns have necessitated Synchrotech maintenance spe-
cialists to take long ship rides with the OSS Nimitz to fix
the DADO and restore the system to normal operational
capability.
Operational units were not the only activities
to suffer degraded mission readiness because of the unrelia-
ble equipment. The Fleet Combat Direction systems Support
Activity which originally provided life cycle support for
MPDS also experienced operational interruptions due to DADO
failures. This was due primarily to the lack of complete
logistic support. The failures resulted in a substantial
reduction in the unit's ability to meet fleet support
requirements [Ref. 46].
In March of 1978, Capt. A.E. Huff USN3, who was
a hardware system engineer for Martin Marietta Company in
Denver, Colorado, did an analysis of MPDS during his two
weeks of active duty with the Naval Electronic Systems Com-
mand. He made the following remarks about the DADO:
32

Since only four of these DAD'J units presently exist, the
ESQ procures replacement boards on an "as call basis".
This creates longer than usual replacement time and
costs around $1000 per card [Ref. 47].
Capt. fluff stated that an item which could serve as a
replacement for the DADU is a unit called MICS. It is cur-
rently being used by the Air Force's Strategic Air Command
with apparent success. The modern circuit technology used
in MICS is estimated to reduce maintenance cost by as much
as 90 ] and greatly increase reliability,
b. MU 570 Drum
MPDS was designed with two drums to provide
added capacity and redundancy. The initial specifications
called for a single IBM disk unit, but the contractor, Plan-
ning Research Corporation (PRC) f wisely convinced the
Government Project Office of the need for the increased
speed which was available in the M0 570 magnetic drums [Ref.
48]. The drums have also been characterized by low MTBF and
frequent logistic problem. However, the failure of one drum
does not force the entire system to shut down, which is what
occurs when the DADO" fails. This is because the second drum
is capable of supporting the system in a degraded mode.
c. General Hardware Characteristics
MPDS was designed with a tremendous amount of
hardware redundancy. The system is programmed to gracefully
die without interrupting normal message processing until the
last spare unit collapses. This feature of MPDS is
extremely valuable when the system is experiencing heavy
loading while fulfilling operational commitments. During
these periods, it would be very difficult to shut down the
system for troubleshooting, so the designers made this
procedure unnecessary by providing sufficient equipment
spares to allow the system to continue to operate [Ref. 49].
3 . Omissions to the Functional Description
Several maintenance problems surfaced when the fleet
users discovered that the new system did not do everything
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that they needed. Two areas which were of particular
concern to the users were message storage limitations and
NATO message handling.
a. Message Storage Limitations
The Commander of Carrier Group Two, who was
embarked onboard the USS Niraitz, was deeply concerned about
the system's limited online message retrieval capability.
He wrote the following comments in a letter to his Command-
ing Officer:
The existing MPDS capacity did not provide sufficient
online message storage to oermit more extensive user
recall of recent messages . ^ . hence duplicate paper
files were maintained to provide copies of messages that
had been removed from online storage. Ten days of
online message recall capability is considered a reason-
able target [Ref. 50],
Although the system was obviously not providing adequate
message retrieval services, it was performing up to the
standards outlined in the Functional Description. The fol-
lowing is the message storage requirement contained in the
Functional Description:
3.2.1.10 System messages and associated . . . entries
shall be stored for approximately three days on online
mass storage to support duplicate search. message
retrieval. report generation and other functions [Ret.
51].
b. NATO Message Processing
The capability to process North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) message traffic was not included as part
of the automated MPDS. Consequently, the U*SS Nimitz was
required to process NATO traffic manually during a large
part of her deployment to Europe [Ref. 52]. Several tempo-
rary patches were made to the system to allow for partial
automated handling of NATO messages. The Commander of Task




Without the partial automated NATO processing capability
achieved by patches. the task (of processing all of the
NATO traffic) would have been close to impossible [Ref.
53].
The Functional Description for MPDS made no
requirements for NATO automatic message processing capabili-
ties. A permanent software change to allow automatic
processing of NATO messages was installed onboard the OSS
Nimitz after the completion of the deployment,
c. Message Traffic Estimates
Naval telecommunications message traffic has
been increasing each year as the quality and speed of ser-
vice has continued to improve. The Military Specifications
for MPD5 were written in 1967 when the a/erage traffic
volumes for aircraft carriers were much lower than what
would be found in the fleet today. The following MPDS
requirements are taken from the original Military
Specification:
3.1.14 Data rates and capacity.— The system when oper-
ating "on-line" shall . . ~. be possible to handle up to
2500 average messages per day and to retrievably store
up to 7500 average messages.
3.1.13 Average traffic units
.
--system capacity and pro-
cessing rate requirements herein shall be based oh an
average message length of 200 words [Ref. 54].
The average length of messages has increased to above 200
words because fleet units are now sending more administra-
tive traffic over the fleet broadcast which used to be
delivered by mail.
MPDS has been required to process average mes-
sage volumes in excess of 3500 messages per day when the USS
Nimitz had the Task Force Commander embarked during major
fleet exercises in the Mediterranean Sea [Ref. 55].
4 . The Effects of Operations 'Jpon Maintenance
The urgent necessity of intense fleet operations has
frequently been the cause for delays in both corrective and
scheduled maintenance. During the 1976 deployment of the
35

USS Nimitz, several hardware and software problems developed
which coald not bs handled by the ship's maintenance crew.
Synchrotech sent a software team aboard the carrier during
part of the deployment to correct problems and make recom-
mendations for system improvements. Following are a few
comments made by the software specialist concerning their
shipboard experience:
It is nearly impossible to debug a software system in an
operational environment, expecially with traffic volumes
which are typically associated with a flag command. The
system cannot be surrendered to the exclusive use of
progranmer s to test and debug ... an outage of even 30
minutes creates traffic backlogs untenable to the staff
and ship users (Ref. 56].
It is evident from the above statement that a system with
low MTBF would function more successfully in an intense
operational environment. Another way of solving the mainte-
nance problem is to design a system which offers a short
mean time to repair (MTTR) . Many systems are available
today which are modularly constructed to allow average tech-
nicians to pull the defective module and insert a
replacement module in a very short time frame.
5 . Improved Reliability
MPDS has now been in the fleet for six years. Dur-
ing this time the operators and maintenance personnel have
acquired a wealth of valuable knowledge about the system.
This increased knowledge has enabled the fleet users to
maintain the system in a higher state of readiness. Many of
the original maintenance problems were due to the fact that
it is difficult to maintain an unfamiliar system regardless
of the level of technical expertise of your personnel [Ref.
57].
Synchrotech software specialists were called aboard
the USS Nimitz to solve several technical problems which
appeared to be beyond the technical ability of the ship's
maintenance crew. The software specialist said the
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following about the magnetic drum failures in the trip
report which they submitted:
Magnetic drums— The message file clerks, who use a work
area and table which is mounted directly in front of the
drums, were stacking burn bags (baqs full of old mes-
sages which are scheduled to "be burned) en the floor
directly in front of the drum. This restricted the
badly needed air circulation required by the MU-570 drum
to maintain a reasonable ambient air temperature, and
the drum began experiencing intermittent errors. Remo-
val of the bags resolved the problem [Ref. 58].
This is an example of how the operators learned valuable
information about the heat sensitivity of the drums and the
air circulation patterns in the computer room. This infor-
mation should be available for future operators of the
system and consequently further heat problems with the drums
should be avoided. The net summation of these learning
experiences is quite often a more reliable system.
Another factor contributing to improved performance
was the installation of 18 software releases by FCDSSASD and
NTSIC [Ref. 59], These software releases have provided
incremental improvements to the operating system, mainte-
nance subsystems, and the retrieval subsystem. They have
added the capability to process NATO messages, accumulate
and process useful data for periodic reports, and generally
improve overall system performance.
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7 CONCLOSION AND RECOHKENDATIOKS
A. OVERVIEW
The MPDS project history has provided a classic example
of how failure can occur in the military computer acquisi-
tion process. This failure was the result of the Navy not
giving sufficient attention to four major elements of the
acquisition process.
The first and primary problem was the Navy's failure to
do detailed planning at the beginning of the project prior
to initial developmental work. Inadequate time spent upon
planning resulted in the project not having a well mapped
course to follow. Cost over runs and problems with mainte-
nance, training, and logistics could also be attributed to
poor planning. Eighteen change releases by the Navy's sys-
tem support activities were required to correct many of the
problems which had their origins in the system planning
p h as e
.
Failure to freeze the design early in the project was
another significant problem with the developmental process.
The Facility Control System's design was permitted to change
and grow until the system had to be terminated because it
was going to make the entire MPDS project late and drive the
total cost of the project beyond acceptable limits. Project
scheduling problems developed because no one knew when the
FCS would be finished since it was not known what the fin-
ished product was supposed to look like.
Ambiguous and/or incomplete military specifications also
contributed to the project office's problems. The project
office had to make design decisions on an adhoc basis with-
out the benefit of the explicit directions usually contained
in the specifications. The composite of these decisions was
a system which provided too many reports of minimal value,
terminal functions which were not used, and which could not
operate in a NATO environment.
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Finally a comprehensive cost/benefit analysis was never
performed to determine the true feasibility of the proposed
systems. The high risk associated with the FCS was never
fully recognized in the feasibility study. Alternative sys-
tems were not considered in the feasibility study. As a
result of the above, the service wasted a lot of money while
pursuing the development of a system which never material-
ized. The lack of alternative systems in the feasibility
study deprived the Navy of the option to select a more
appropriate design. Appendix (G) lists several of the alter-
native design options which were available for
considerat ion.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
More time needed to be spent in the planning phase to
prepare a comprehensive Configuration Management Plan,
Training Plan, Security Plan, and Integrated Logistic Sup-
port Plan. These documents would have provided guick
reference for the project team to use when confronted with
major decisions. The plans would have contained procedures
for establishing a change control board and would have out-
lined the major project objectives for training, security,
and logistics. Such detailed guidance was badly needed by
the MPDS project team and would have prevented many of the
problems which resulted from the adhoc decisions. [Ref. 63]
A Program Plan which provided for periodic reviews would
also have been helpful to the project team. One of the
functions of the review team would be to consider freezing
the system/subsystem's design. Early freezing of the FCS
design could have prevented that system's development from
falling behind schedule.
Future computer system acquisitions should place heavy
emphasis on preparing thorough and clear specifications.
This could be accomplished by establishing a specification
review team consisting of both system sponsors and technical
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users who will initially verify the original specification
and who would later approve/disapprove specification
changes. This would have prevented many of the problems
which occurred in the MPDS project where the users and spon-
sors received a product which was different than they had
requested.
Concise specifications have the advantage of focusing
heavily upon the end product. Such focus tends to prevent
the technicians from becoming overly intrigued with the
technical sophistication of their system and forces them to
concentrate on developing an end product which matches the
specification. This procedure would limit or reduce the
problem of acquiring extremely sophisticated hardware and
software as the Navy did with MPDS because the developers
would not be given a blank specification sheet where they
could fill in the details.
To ensure compliance with the above objectives, it is
recommended that Project Sponsors include them in the Letter
of Instruction (LOI) , which signals the beginning of the
acquisition process. By placing these requirements at the
on-set of the project, they will receive the attention that
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The most important decision that tha Communication
Planners had to make was concerning the selection of the
type of system which they were going to develop for instal-
lation onboard the Nimitz. The system had to satisfy the
major communications objectives of reducing human interven-
tion, increasing processing speed, as well as being able to
handle the extremely large volumes of message traffic nor-
mally associated with air craft carriers and their embarked
Flag Officers' staffs. Important decisions had to be made
concerning the number of manual activities to be automated,
what functions should be placed online, and what processing
speeds should be obtained.
2. Alternative Dasi?n Approaches
a. Semi-Automatic
The HPDS developed for the (J3S Oklahoma City
(CG-5) is an exampla of a system which satisfied the stated
objectives while using minimal hardware and software
resources. The automated features of this system did not
include remote terminal message and report retrieval ser-




The MPDS developed for the DS3 Nimitz offered
maximum automation, high processing speeds, and very high
massage processing rates. The hardware and software were
characterized by high interdependancies and sophistication.
c. Hybrid Approach
Many combinations of semi-automated and fully
automated features ware available for the planners to con-
sider. Any system which performed the






The semi-automated system was built from exist-
ing hardware. It took minimal time to become fully
operational. The cost to develop the CG-5 system was rela-
tively low.
b. Fully Automated System
The CVN-68 system offered many online services
to the users such as remote terminal message services [Ref.
60]. These services have increased user productivity and
communications accuracy.
4 . Pisa dvantages
a. Semi-Automated
This system requires a lot of manual interven-
tion in the message handling process. The users have to
walk their outgoing messages traffic to Radio Central. Mes-
sage retrievals take a relatively long time to process.
b. Fully Automated
The primary disadvantages are high development
cost and maintenance difficulties due to the high sophisti-




The planners had to make a performance/cost trade-
off in selecting the communications system for MPDS. The
decision to develop a highly automated system reflects the
planners' emphasis on maximum performance.
B. HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE SELECTION
Another important area which was of concern to the plan-
ners was hardware and software selection. Plans had to be
made outlining policy on the use of existing hardware and
software. Decisions had to be made concerning what specifi-
cations would be used for items that had to be developed.
The decisions made by the planners can be found in the
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Military Specification and the Functional Description. The
results of these decisions can be observed onboard the USS




The planners decided to use existing equipment and
design where they were available, for MPDS [Raf. 61]. The
pieces of equipment which were to be used were listed in the
Military Specifications.
2. Develop New Units
Another approach would have been to develop an
entirely new suite of hardware and software.
3 Aivanta qes
a. Utilizs Existing Units
Several savings can be obtained by using exist-
ing units. The project can save a lot of time and money by
not having to develop a new unit. The amount of risk
involved in the development is also much lower when one has
a known reliable unit in stock.
b. Develop New Units
The major advantage to developing new units is
increase in performance.
4 . Pisa dvan taqes
a. Utilizing Existing Units
The existing units may be functioning below the
standards of the new equipment. Opportunities for improved
performance may be lost because outdated units are not
replaced by more efficient/effective units.
b. Develop New Units
New developments often run a high degree of risk
which could result in a late delivery. New units often run-
up the cost of the project.
5. Major Decisions
Again the planners were required to make judgemental
decisions about performance/cost trade-offs. Since new
49

units usually increased both performance and cost, and
existing units tended to reduce project cost, the planners
had to select the appropriate trade-offs.
The planners' decision to use existing units for
MPDS proved to be a wise one sines the new units experienced
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